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Drone Strikes and terrorism in Pakistan -  
rather a part of the problem than a solution? 
 
Basically one can state that the world is experiencing in the last decades a tectonic shift in 
is overall security situation determined by a tremendous decline of major deadly conflicts in 
quantitative terms. Furthermore, there is a new kind of conflict scenarios. Doubtless the 
most consequential one is the ‘war against terror’ initiated by the US, exemplifying how the 
nature of war is changing in recent history. Here, the enemies are not anymore 
predominantly states rather irregular terrorists and other religious militant groupings like Al-
Qaida as well as its networks of allies. Since most of these Islamic fundamentalists are 
based and/or operating in regions to which the US has only limited access (like Pakistan’s 
Federal Administered Tribal Area, in brief FATA, at the border to Afghanistan), Washington 
was subsequently expanding its portfolio of military options to respond. Besides the 
restructuring of its armed forces – meaning the reducing of ground forces on one side and 
the build of up Special Operations Forces (SOF) on the other side, the build-up of 
capacities in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs; or remotely piloted aerial 
systems/RPAS) gained prominence. Latter ones advanced to such a crucial instrument of 
US President Barak Obama’s counterterrorism strategy that it seems Washington’s whole 
campaign against terrorist, terrorist suspects and/or other militant opponents (insurgents) 
depends on the deployment of UVAs/RPAS, commonly known as drones. For example the 
use of drones in extraterritorial operations was increasing steeply in the immediate years 
after its first successful deployment in 2001. 
Generally drones are used in a variety of fields, not only as a weapon platform but 
also as an instrument for surveillance including observation, reconnaissance, monitoring, 
search and rescue operations, providing disaster relief, helping to locate and identify 
missing persons in a natural disaster, or offering emergency communication among others. 
4 
This broad operative range shows how ambivalent drones and subsequently debates over 
them are. However, today’s focus of public attention seems to be preoccupied with the 
‘lethal dimension’ of the UAVs, especially since the so called target assassinations through 
drones have become a routine matter. Here one should mention that the debate gathered 
only momentum after the first US citizen abroad was killed in a drone strike. It is also 
interesting to note, that besides the fact that the frequency of drone strikes is declining the 
debate over usefulness, morally-ethical arguments, political and strategic purposes, and 
the existence of remarkable grew areas in international and domestic laws is gathering 
momentum - not only in Pakistan but also in Europe and finally also in the US. 
Nevertheless, it seems obviously that besides the tremendous negative facets of the 
deployment of drones, their use will continue. In order to understand the ambiguity in these 
trajectories, it is necessary to do an overall assessment of the various rationales of 
protagonists and antagonists of armed drone strikes. 
To begin with, one should shed some light on the arguments in support of the use of 
UAVs which are mostly centred on the strategic value of drones as well as economic 
advantages. Here, the rationale is focusing on the question about the contribution of drone 
strikes to a mission and what is the effectiveness of the drone deployment. Having these 
issues in mind, protagonists are emphasizing three ‘apparent’ pros favouring the use of 
armed UAVs: First, drone missions are more precise then other weapon systems, like 
tanks, artillery, cruise missiles, manned aircraft among others. Second, the deployment of 
UAVs is creating less (own) human losses and less physical damage compared to the use 
regular forces. In this direction drones are described as an economically priced option 
when the targets are limited and confined, especially when they help to avoid US ground 
troops in an extraordinary dangerous operational environment or political sensitive area. 
Third, drones can give decision-makers time and space for the achievement of the overall 
goals of counter terrorism campaigns, like the build-up of a legitimate government and 
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respective political administrative infrastructures and to the greatest possible extent the 
protection of the population in affected areas.   
However, recent developments like the emergence of so called ‘home grown 
terrorism’, rising numbers of innocent civilians deaths, and the endemic grow of terrorist 
groups and activities in Pakistan (and Afghanistan) is seriously questioning the arguments 
of the drone protagonists. This trend is getting reflected in a clear intensification of the 
debate regarding the usefulness of drone strikes as well as the rising protest in the region 
and the emergence of critical voices in Europa and US. The rising unpopularity and critic is 
focusing mainly on following flashpoints: 
 
Disputable efficiency 
 
One of the most contented issues regarding the deployment of drones is their efficiency. 
However, in order to evaluate the outcome of drone strikes, one should recall the initial 
directives of their deployment by the US: First, drone missions are supposed to deprive 
terrorists of operational depth in areas of limited statehood. Second, drones should 
eliminate high-ranking operational leaders of terrorist groups (like Al-Qaida and 
affiliates/partners/allies), based on the notion that their assassination undermines the 
planning and consequently the conducting of major terrorist attack.  
By evaluating the data available, the outcome of the drone strikes with regard to the above 
mentioned aim looks in the best case mixed. To begin with, the US was able with the help 
of drones to eliminate numerous terrorists and terrorist suspects. In result, the 
organisational structure of Al-Qaida and several other groups got crucial weakened. But 
the drone strikes were mainly targeting second-tier, less important members of the terrorist 
network. In consequence, instead of eradicating the organisation, Al-Qaida got pushed 
from an operational body towards an ideological centre providing ‘spiritual guidance’. The 
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carrying out of the concrete direct terrorist action was instead franchised to partner 
organisation, accepting Al-Qaida ideological leadership. In other words, Al-Qaida got in 
quantitative-structural terms weaker but gained qualitative-ideological leverage. 
Additionally, the loss of structure on the side of Al-Qaida got compensated by the gain of 
strength of Al-Qaida’s affiliated organizations. Another point to take into account by looking 
at the effectiveness of drone strikes is that there are clear indications that Al-Qaida and its 
partners persistently acquiring knowledge to protect themselves against the threat of drone 
strikes. In this context, it is interesting to note that the greatest (symbolic) success in the 
war against terror, namely the assassination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 in the 
Pakistani city Abbottabad, was largely due to the deployment of SOF and not through the 
use of drones.  
Last but not least there is a trend to question the insufficiently reflected belief in the 
supremacy of UVA technology heavily determining Obama’s counterterrorism strategy. As 
indicated above, protagonists of armed drones prefer to emphasize the precision of this 
weapon system. Also the Obama administration deliberately refers to the drone 
deployment as ‘surgical’ undertaking. This notion of drones is at best an Orwellian myth, or 
a downright dishonest metaphor. However, it is definitely not a cunning strategy to promote 
the use of armed drones since the reality on the ground is telling a quite different story. 
Doubtless, drones are less destructive and more precise than artillery, tanks, or a 
‘conventional air strike’. It is also quite perspicuous that der deployment of UAV systems is 
making sense in a variety of fields under certain (favourable) conditions. But there are also 
severe shortcomings (technical and human ones) attached to drone technology. Technical 
challenges like the phenomenon of ‘latency’, meaning that a movement displayed on a 
drone pilot’s screen is still a certain period behind what the drone sees (the delay is 
produced because of the transmission of the signal via the satellite in space). Another 
reason why drones are unlike surgery is because for the effective use of drones one relies 
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on information on the ground which is regularly provided from local partner. But their 
reliability must in most cases be questioned. This increases the risk of unintended killings. 
In sum, the drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region must be classified as almost 
completely ineffectual when it comes to the prevention of potential terrorist threats.    
 
Changing threat scenarios of terrorism – the emergence of ‘neighbourhood targets’ 
 
One should emphasize that both, the high numbers of innocent victims, and the drones as 
symbols of the US omnipotence and unjustified acts of violence, will serve as a catalyst of 
recruitment among the disgruntled and angry people suffering from the strikes of the 
drones. It is noteworthy, that there is not only in Pakistan but also in US and Europe a 
rising outrage creating new dimension of the jihadist threat, the so called ‘home grown 
terrorism’. In other words, the targets of US counterterrorism campaigns are located not 
any more far away in Asia or Africa, but with its own border. Here it is interesting to note 
that the armed drone missions have obviously superseded the prison in Guantanamo Bay 
as the main recruitment instrument for religious fanatics. The ‘Times Square Bomber’ 
Faisal Shahzad, who directly referred to the deployment of armed UAVs as justification for 
his action in 2010 is one example for an emerging phenomenon among Islamic youth in 
western societies: gravitating to Islamic fundamentalist ideology and militancy. In sum, by 
observing the growing numbers of new terrorist among the Islamic youth beyond the areas 
of armed drone operations, one must state that armed drone missions produced more new 
militant Islamic fundamentalists than are killed by the strikes themselves. Furthermore, the 
emerging of new type of terrorist threats, especially at the ‘home front’ cannot be prevented 
by UAVs. This deserves different strategies and related tactics. 
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Socio-economic costs 
 
Since it is in the nature of drones to take the combatant (and unfortunately innocent non-
combatants too) by surprise, the people in the affected areas usually don’t know when to 
expect a strike. Subsequently they have to live with a persistent (literally ’24 hours-a-day’), 
omnipresent fear. This has a remarkable impact on public and social life. People avoid 
greater gatherings like markets or mosques, family events (weddings, funerals etc.) or 
don’t send their children to school. Also the meetings of the assemblies of the tribal elders 
(jirgas) are happening in some areas in a lower frequency. This is in a tribal society a 
significant violation of social and cultural values, norms, tradition and needs. Furthermore, 
it has a negative impact on the social harmony and the traditional (self-) administration of 
the local population since such meetings are perceived as a place for conflict resolution 
and the engagement with different social issues. This is gaining significance since the 
institutions of the tribal elders got already under severe pressure by the Taliban focusing at 
the destruction of the traditional system of authority of the tribal society. Subsequently, the 
restrictions on the functioning of the jirgas imposed by the threat of drone strike are given 
Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist elements more leeway in public opinion making and 
handling of community affairs in FATA. This will make the tribes not only more rigid, 
conservative, and suspicious but has also the potential to create resentments towards 
Washington (as initiator of the drone strikes) and Islamabad (because of not stopping 
drone strikes). In consequence, instead of eradication terrorism, drone strikes rather help 
to preserve the tribal areas as safe haven for terrorist and respective suspects. 
Furthermore, the weakening of the traditional ‘political-administrative institution’ are given 
new political actors room to manoeuvre, like Islamist parties and other religious hardliner, 
who function as anti-systemic forces. This finds its expression in undermining the 
consolidation of democracy by questioning the core democratic values of people 
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sovereignty, liberty, and equality in the targeted area. Due to the fact that the FATA remains 
historically in a constitutional and legal limbo turning basic political and civic rights into 
distant visions, the people are feeling even more victimized and left alone. Furthermore, 
they get the impression that the international community seems neither to have interest in 
the area nor in the people living there.  
Additionally, the education of the youth is also hampered because pupils have to 
substitute lost workforce (here understood as killed family members) instead of school 
attendance. Further deterioration of the economic conditions is caused because farmers 
refuse to work in the fields out of fear of getting targeted by a drone. In sum, the 
deterioration of socio-economic condition of the people suffering from drone strikes will 
serve as an additional recruiting tool for the terrorists.  
 
General radicalisation of people in affected areas 
 
Another side effect of drone strikes is that they are not only serving fundamentalist as an 
argument for recruitment but also lead to a serious radicalisation of the people living in the 
affected area in general. The people feel bullied, hassled and browbeaten. Particularly the 
practice of ‘double tap drone strikes’ is outraging the people. Because these attacks are 
creating additional fears and predominantly killing people which are trying to help injured 
people of the first echelon of UVAs a getting targeted by a second attack. Having this in 
mind, the obvious disinterest of the Obama administration in conducting transparent 
investigations leading to a punishment of those responsible for killing non-combatants, the 
lack of adequate payment of compensation for the families of victimised innocent civilians 
or a sufficient access to redress is increasing the level of frustration and general 
radicalisation of the affected local population. This could prepare the ground for processes 
of radical Islamisation of the people making them vulnerable for militant activities. In result, 
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any continuation of armed drone mission in Af-Pak region will serve as a recruiting tool for 
the global jihad.    
 
Missing transparency 
 
Furthermore, as already indicated above, one of the major problems in the context of drone 
deployment is the missing transparency and accountability. Due to the fact that the US 
drone program is classified, obviously it is difficult to find official figures or reliable 
data/statistics. There are no available information for the amount of armed drone missions 
or the -intended or accidental - casualties, nor is there any official information regarding the 
process of identifying targets. Available information in the media, academic circles or 
“unnamed governments sources diverge considerably”, are either systematically 
undercount or estimated on an extraordinary high level for partial interests involved. 
Subsequently there is a clear need to provide information regarding the decision of the 
individual deployment of drones (for example CIA or US armed forces), targeting process, 
and information on number of missions, and outcomes, namely more precise date on 
human and physical damage. 
Nevertheless, it seems that there are some positive signs. Most noteworthy is that 
the ‘domestic resistance’ in the US against Drone strikes is getting slightly noisier and/or 
more articulate in these days. More concrete, there are indications for an increase in 
parliamentary oversight as well as more societal control through the general US public. 
Latter one finds its expression for example in a broadening of ‘open debate’ on the role of 
drones they play in target killings. Where initially critic got predominantly expressed as 
disapproval of the killing US citizens (a process which started with the extrajudicial killing of 
Abwar al-Awlaki in Jemen, September 2011), in recent time the rising number of non-
combatants (including non-US citizens) is some space in the public discourse. However, 
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one should overestimate this trend, especially its impact on general continuation of the use 
of drones. Nevertheless, one could identify here one causal factor working towards a 
decline of actual drone strikes. Furthermore, since the Obama administration is keen on 
gaining domestic legitimacy for his ‘drone war’, an intense public criticism could lead to a 
diminishing leeway and freedom of action for the US government in drone deployment. 
However, one should be aware that an intense debate of legal, moral, and ethical aspects 
of UAVs is still primarily a non-American phenomenon. 
 
Unclear legal status 
 
Generally many of the objections raised by the drone antagonists are actually not UAV-
specific. For example questions regarding the lawfulness of target killings or civilian 
collateral damages are emerging similarly in the context of the deployment of SOF, or the 
use of other unmanned weapon systems like cruise missiles. However, the major critic is 
directed towards the application of drone technology. A significant reason therefore is that 
the international law does not regulate the use of drones in a sufficient manner. In other 
words, when it comes to UAVs the international law remains as a Grew Area featured by 
several competitive position of different laws, for example the conflictual relation between 
international human rights and international humanitarian law. Also emerging tensions 
between concepts of legality and legitimacy remain unresolved. Or in more operational 
terms, can a state break internal law to maintain order? Can be an action ‘reasonable’ and 
not conform to law, meaning strictly legal? In order to deal with existing legal limbos the US 
is basically using UN Charter's article 51 which allows attacks in Self-Defense and the UN 
mandate for Afghanistan. The fact that the Afghanistan campaign is recognized as war 
gives the additional legitimisation of using weapon systems like drone technology. 
Furthermore, the Obama administration is heavily leaning on US domestic law foremost 
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the AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists). This serves 
Washington not only as rationale for the general deployment of UAVs but also to claim the 
right to act pre-emptively within the boundaries of another sovereign state. In the context of 
the international law one has to point out that there are two critical determinants: First, the 
law comes with an exception if the host allows it; second, the principle of proportionality 
must be respected. This gives ‘valid room to manoeuvre’ for the arguments for the 
protagonists as well as antagonists. However, the alleged ignorance and disregard of 
Pakistan’s sovereignty is a serious issue. The US government insists that former 
administration were actively involved in the decision on the use of drones. However, this 
might be true for the administration of Pervez Musharraf and Asif Ali Zardari. But it seems 
obviously that under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif there is a new situation and a policy shift 
towards a negative perception of the drones. This is significant since this means a 
withdrawal of the allowance for the US to carry out attacks at Pakistani territory. Therefore, 
one could interpret drone strikes as clear challenge of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity - because it constitutes obviously an undue (lacking allowance by the government 
of Pakistan) interference in the country’s internal affairs. Regarding this rationale, drone 
strikes would mark a violation of international law. Finally, the assessment of the principle 
of proportionality regarding to drone strikes remains much difficult to review because of the 
lack of reliable data and existing asymmetries in all facets of warfare and attached socio-
economic and political implication for all actors involved. Nevertheless, besides the fact 
that also this aspects remains quite unclear it is at least possible to state that US would 
have a responsibility to act according to the standards of day-to-day behaviour in 
international society. However, an adequate answer to this question is beyond the scope of 
this article. Nevertheless, one can and must state that the US drone strikes in Pakistan are 
on a tremendous shaky legal ground at best. 
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Changed international perception of drone strikes 
 
There is a changed perception in the international community regarding drones. The 
number of states and international institutions/organisations condemning the strikes by 
UAVs are growing. One of the most prominent examples is the condemnation of drone 
strikes by the European Parliament in February 2014 (Resolution on the use of armed 
drones; 2014/2567(RSP)). This marks a trend which the Obama administration should take 
more into account, especially in the context of the future development of ties between US 
and EU/Europe. At the moment they must be described rather as an ‘uneasy, complicated 
relationship` than a profound ‘all-weather friendship’. Remarkable difficulties to coordinate 
a common US-EU approach in crisis like Libya, Syria, or now Ukraine combined with the 
severe irritations over the NSA (National Security Agency) ‘Spying Affair’ indicate that the 
transatlantic dialogue got more difficult since the aftermath of 9/11. However, the EU will 
most likely not take an all too confrontational position towards the US on the issue of drone 
deployments in general. Because also the EU member states are identifying drones as a 
‘must-have’ item for the modernisation of their armed forces. In other words, Europe too 
will try to increase its drone capabilities for military as well as civilian purposes. But critical 
points like the conflicting legal frameworks (on the domestic as well as international level) 
and the subsequent violation of international law, territorial integrity and sovereignty of a 
country, the unlawful target killings as well as lack of transparency of US missions are 
continuing to race grave concerns on side of EU. As such, a ‘non-reflected’ continuation of 
lethal drone operations (and ignoring international human rights laws) has the potential to 
be an additional burden for the quality of US-EU relations. This burden will not enhance 
significantly existing rifts between US Americans and Europeans. Nevertheless, it will also 
not help to improve the faulty atmosphere during the on-going political negotiations and 
accompanying public debates over the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
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Partnership). By haying said this, the decision of the European Parliament to condemn “the 
use of armed drones outside the international legal framework” sends at least a clear 
signal that Europe will not remain quite in this direction. In consequence one could point 
out, that today UVA missions are increasingly identified as counterproductive due to the 
negative perception among the international community. 
To conclude, the most crucial criterion for any assessment of deployments of armed 
UAVs should be the question of sustainability. Therefore the essential question must be 
asked, what is the long-term contribution of drones for the solution of a conflict? The case 
of Pakistan stresses clearly that the US drone strikes do not offer a comprehensive solution 
to the causes of conflict, foremost the challenge of eliminating potential threats for the US 
originating from Pakistani soil. Nevertheless, the use of drones can be part of a solution as 
an element of a coherent, transparent and accountable approach including (combining) 
political and military elements. Hence, the notion by the US that drone strikes must be 
seen as the lesser evil should be carefully reconsidered. But the political realities in 
Washington are quite different. Basically the numbers of drone strikes are declining. But 
this, apparently, is not because of a fundamental change in the mind-set of security 
decision-makers regarding the deployment of drones.  
A worrying factor in this context is the way how US politicians, especially President 
Barak Obama, portrays and justifies the use of drones. It hints at another, ‘special’ threat of 
‘digitised, robotic warfare’: The inhibition threshold to undertake a military 
encounter/operation is much less then with manned and/or more complex/larger weapon 
system. In other words, since by using drones lives of human soldiers are kept out of 
harm’s way might lower the barriers to war by promoting a certain kind of 
bellicosity/belligerence. Consequently, an increase in states possessing UAV capabilities 
(armed as well as unarmed systems) could lead also to a rising feasibility of unmanned but 
still ‘armed’ confrontation. The fact, that the drones deployment by US military and CIA did 
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not initiate for a long time any noteworthy debate in the US (neither in Congress nor in 
media) can be seen as evidence for this phenomenon. Since no human costs (own 
soldiers) for the US are involved, decision makers and general public obviously do not 
classify drone strike as war. Only the target killings of US citizen abroad were picked up as 
theme for discussion, but rather from legal than moral and political perspectives. Until now, 
this lack of general interests and awareness was resulting in a gap of parliamentary 
oversight, and perhaps even responsible for the exponential increase of drone deployment 
by the Obama administration. Taking the numerous border conflicts and disputes over 
territory into account, the deployment of drones will lead to further stress in bilateral 
relations and generate more instability in South and (South) East Asia. 
By facing such an upcoming threat scenario, it is most important that one should 
have not too much confidence in the use of drones due numerous technical shortcomings 
and not calculable risks. In doing an overall assessment of the drone strikes it is important 
not to focus solely on the number of the death (combatants and non-combatants) as the 
only indicator for assessment. By measuring the efficiency of drone strikes with view on the 
major goal (eradicating of avoiding future terrorist attacks on the US), the concrete and 
wider impacts on the ground has to be taken into account, especially the social, economic, 
and political costs as well as the general perception of the UAVs deployment. Also the idea 
of great power responsibility should be part of any evaluation especially by elaborating on 
the issues of legitimacy and legality. In this direction there is doubtless the need for more 
transparency and accountability regarding the identification of targets. 
However, the pace of the build-up of drone capacities in the US does indicate the 
continuation of the willingness in Washington of deploying them, especially regarding the 
use of UAVs in Pakistan (and Afghanistan). At the moment, it is getting obvious that there is 
no more only a one-sided armament by US and allies. Especially Asian states, like China, 
are keeping up in know-how and capabilities in drones. There are signs of the beginning of 
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a ‘classical arms race’ in the area of armed and unarmed UAVs following similar patterns 
like the arms race during cold war regarding nuclear and conventional weapon systems. 
However, the actors involved in this competition seem not willing to learn the lessons of the 
past that the gaining of a permanent advantages in military technological over its 
combatant remains a myth. But the history also shows that the invention and the 
consequent application of such ‘new revolutionary technology’ as instruments for waging 
combat is often leading to a change of social and political structures. For example the use 
of the longbow by organised peasant archers not only made the British victorious over the 
French at the Battle of Agincourt (1415) but marked also the end of age of feudalism and a 
change of social composition of military organisation in Europe. Also the use of drones is 
accompanied with tremendous impacts on the conduct of war. It is out of question, that the 
‘digitising of warfare’ is demanding a different kind of ‘soldier’ operating in distance from the 
theatre of conflict, instead of wearing a martial battle dress they are pinstriped and are 
sitting behind a tidy desk instead of struggling for survival in remote misanthropic areas. 
Having this in mind, many drone antagonists opine that there is not only a geographical but 
also emotional detachment creating an inherent immorality of relying on the use of armed 
UAVs to achieve military goals. However, in Pakistan it will not lead to an end of terrorism 
since drones are dealing just with the consequences but not with the causes of it. The 
resilience of Islamic fundamentalist militancy and related organisations must be seen as 
indication for the inefficiency and uselessness of drone strikes in eradicating the roots of 
terrorism in Pakistan in a sustainable manner. Nevertheless, despite all controversies, it is 
most likely that the use of UAVs will continue to take on an ever larger role as instruments 
in military conflict solutions in Pakistan and beyond.  
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